NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY

Major Marine Accident :
Interviews of Investigation: :
JAPANESE FISHERIES TRAINING VESSEL, :
EHIME MARU : DCA 01 MM 022
AND : DCA 01 MM 022
U.S. NAVY NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE, :
USS GREENEVILLE : :

Saturday, February 17, 2001

INTERVIEW OF LCDR GERALD PFEIFER [ACCOMPANIED BY LCDR TIM STONE]

INTERVIEWING PANEL:

National Transportation Safety Board

TOM ROTH-ROFFY, Accident Investigator BILL WOODY
BARRY STRAUCH, Human Factor Specialist

<u>United States Navy</u>

CDR JOHN CACCIVIO, SUBPAC LCDR RICH SANTOMAURO CAPT TOM KYLE, SUBPAC

United States Coast Guard

LCDR CRAIG PETERSON LTJG KEN KUSANO LT CHARLIE JOHNSON [TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

PROCEEDINGS

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: We are on the record. time is now 13:07. The date is the 17th of February We are interviewing Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer, the executive officer of the Greeneville.

> Good afternoon, Commander Pfeifer. LCDR PFEIFER: Good afternoon, sir.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: My name is Tom Roth-Roffy, and I am an accident investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. I am sevearl other investigators are here investigating the accident that occurred between the USS Greeneville and the shipping vessel, Ehime Maru, that occurred on February 9th, 2001.

For your information, the National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal Government agency responsible for investigating transportation accidents in the United States. NTSB's Office of Marine Safety, in which I work, is responsible for investigating major marine accidents that occur on the waterways of the United States.

The purpose of the Safety Board's investigation is to determine the cause of the accident and to make recommendations aimed at preventing the reoccurrence of similar accidents. We will make no effort to assign blame or find fault with any person or agency. This investigation is strictly safety in nature and not a legal investigation.

If you desire, you may have a person with you to assist you with this interview. Is that your desire at this time?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, it is. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And --PANEL MEMBER: Say your name.

Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer. LCDR PFEIFER:

Yes, it is.

That person is --MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. LCDR PFEIFER: Lieutenant Commander Stone. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you identify yourself,

please, sir.

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LCDR STONE: Yes. My name is Lieutenant Commander Tim Stone, and I have been assigned by the Navy as the counsel for Commander Pfeifer.

> MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Thank you.

Also joining in the interview this afternoon will be representatives from the United States Coast Guard and the United States Navy, and I would like at this time for them to introduce themselves.

MR. WOODY: Good afternoon. I am Bill Woody from the Safety Board.

I am Barry Strauch, a human MR. STRAUCH: factors investigator with the NTSB.

LT JOHNSON: Lieutenant Charlie Johnson, the United States Coast Guard.

LTJG KUSANO: Lieutenant JG Ken Kusano,

United States Coast Guard.

LCDR PETERSON: Lieutenant Commander Craig Peterson, United States Coast Guard.

LCDR SANTOMAURO: Lieutenant Commander Santomauro, United States Navy.

CAPT KYLE: Captain Tom Kyle, United States Navy.

CDR CACCIVIO: Commander Caccivio from SUBPAC.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So we have three from the Navy and one from SUBPAC.

At this time, Commander Pfeifer, I would like you to think back to the morning of February 9th, Friday morning, and in narrative form describe your activities during the morning and afternoon of Friday, February 9th, and providing as much detail as you can what your activities were, what you were doing, what you said to you, what you told other people, what you saw and what you heard. Please provide as much detail as you can. I would like you to go through from start to finish, and we will not interrupt you during your narrative description.

So, when you are ready, please proceed with that.

LCDR STONE: Sir, because Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer has been -- and we have been notified that he is a potential party in a court of inquiry which could lead to criminal prosecution or potential criminal prosecution in any number of military forms, Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer on the advice of counsel would like to limit those things in which he discusses with you to certain areas.

First, what we would like to do, at one point you had asked Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer to fill out a sheet with regards to his activities 72 hours prior. No problems providing that to you. He has that ready and can provide that to you at this time, so, by all means, make that available and you can ask any questions regarding what is on the sheet with regards to 72 hours prior. Although the last part does talk about the underway period which we would like to not discuss at this time. Okay?

And the second, Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer is more than willing to discuss from the point of collision after. If you have questions you would like to ask him about, starting from what happens after from the point right -- well, fairly close to right after the collision point and then the rescue effort, and then those things, if you have questions you would like to ask Commander Pfeifer or if you would like a narrative on any of those things, he would be more than willing to go into those at that time.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Let's start from that point, then, sir, if you would. Start from the moments after the collision and give us a narrative description

from your recollection of your advance activities, what you saw or heard and was told during those -- period of time after the collision.

collision.

LCDR PFEIFER: Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer, and I will just state that I did hand over the sheet of my activities 72 hours before I was asked.

After the collision, it was recognized that there was something wrong. The captain raised a number-two scope and looked around. He verbally expressed some anguish and something to the effect, "Oh, no." That's not exactly what he said. sure exactly what he said, but it was a sad -- it was a sad thing to happen. I knew there was something very I asked him if I could raise number-one scope. wronq. There are two scopes side by side. I asked him, because we were safely on the surface, but I didn't want to interfere with his view or anything. He said it's fine, and I raised number-one scope and I looked and I saw the ship apparently didn't -- or making no way and maybe riding a little low. It just didn't look

I immediately grabbed the 1MC and asked for the chief of the boat to come to the Control Room, and I pointed to a petty officer and asked him to escort the VIPs out of the Control Room and they exited the Control Room through Command Passageway which is at the forward end of the Control Room. And they immediately did that.

natural to me, and I assumed there had been a

I handed the 1MC to the captain and said -- and asked him to make the announcement. He did that he -- he informed the crew that we were involved in a collision, and action started to take place.

My immediate concern was to provide assistance to the people. Being a submarine, I knew there was going to be a finite period of time before that could happen, and another immediate concern of mine was that we get help.

How we do that in the Navy is the OPREP reporting system. I went to radio and on my way there met the senior chief, leading chief petty officer in charge of radio, and we made eye contact, and we discussed the radio circuits (SATHICOM) that we would be talking on and that it would be an OPREP. He went into radio, and I believe he immediately made that report.

I apologize. I may have the next things out of order. A lot of things were happening, but I am recalling as best as I can the events.

In the interest of recovering the people, the rescue swimmers would assemble in crew's mess, and I did go to crew's mess and I checked on their progress. I witnessed and assisted in commencing to drain the forward escape trunk upper hatch. That is a procedure that we have to do so that we can open the forward

escape trunk.

The forward escape trunk is on top of the submarine, not up in the sail, but it is just after the crew's mess area in the vicinity of where the rescue swimmers are assembling, and ideally that would be the location where you would recover people in this situation.

We started to drain. The swimmers were assembling, and I was -- we were prepared to open it, regardless of the amount of water, and then I had a concern that there may be waves and the seas might not cooperate. And I ran into the Control Room, took over one of the scopes. Both of the scopes were manned, and I had directed that earlier so that we are assisting in watching for people in the water.

I took the scope and I looked down, and there were big waves coming over the forward escape trunk area and recognized that if -- if we have -- if we opened that, we would ourselves be in risk of going down.

I mentioned that to the captain, I believe, and then -- but I made an announcement around this time and I directed the rescue swimmers to assemble underneath the bridge and then our rescue attempt would be from the bridge area, and what we have is a wood-and-rope ladder that we can hang over the side of the sail, and it is not the preferred method, but in rough seas, that is the way that we can send swimmers over the side.

Eventually, those swimmers did assemble right underneath the bridge. The ladder was strung over the sail, and we were prepared to go in the water to recover people and assist them if we saw them in the water.

I also -- it was reported to me, and I saw some of this through the scope myself -- was the life rafts that were appearing in the water, and we counted eight. In an effort to assist the crew, understand what was going on and take actions, that I would update them periodically on the 1MC that the ship -- when it had sunk, I think I reported that to them and that there were life rafts in the water, that our rescue effort would be from the sail, and both scopes were manned and were looking for people, something to that effect.

At one point in there -- and I can't tell you exactly when -- I did look through the scope, and at first, I had mentioned that the ship was laying low in the water, but, eventually, I took another look at the scope and it appeared that the bow was pointing up and it was going down. That was a very difficult thing to see because the loss of life was very real then and very, very serious thing to see.

Other things. We eventually in quick order prepared a hard-copy message to back up our voice

message. We received word that the Coast Guard was informed, that a helicopter was on the way -- or helicopters. I don't recall the specifics. We did get word that boats were on the way to rescue these people.

Quizzing our lookouts on the two scopes -- I have alluded to the fact that the bridge was manned and it was. When exactly that was manned, it was almost immediately, and when I discussed that rope ladder going over the side, that was with the bridge manned and access to there. So the officer of the deck was no longer in the Control Room. That was a different officer of the deck, and he was up on the bridge. We had lookout there both with binoculars, and the captain was up there, too, scanning the area.

The ship had maneuvered around the vicinity of the life rafts and was attempting to aid in any way we could.

At -- and I'm jumping around, and you have to understand it is a difficult thing to sequence these memories, but when I did notice and announced that the rescue would be from the sail rather than through the forward escape trunk, I did have a discussion with the captain. I think that was up on the bridge, and he was directing the efforts up there. There was bridge-to-bridge radios up there, and I don't recall who was all talking to who, but all of these things were happening in parallel.

I did notice that while I was running below between the crew's mess, the forward escape trunk, and then the bridge, as I passed the Ward Room, at once I looked in there and our medical response personnel had prepared the Ward Room for casualties and injured people. So I was comfortable that if we were able to bring people on board that they would -- we would be prepared to assist them the best we could.

The hard-copy message was being prepared and other things in parallel, and I asked a gentleman in the Control Room to verify our actions for collision. We have procedures, and I asked him to verify that our procedures were all completed for collision. He reported that the immediate actions were done, with the exception of a couple ventilation valves which it would have been inappropriate to shut seeing that we had the bridge manned and this condition that we were in, and I verified that those were -- that was the right thing to do. Then, later, he told me that the supplemental actions were done.

I was also concerned of -- you know, after these things were done with casualties to our own ship, I hadn't heard anything, and we were asking for the status of any damage to our own ship and there was a report of some damage aft.

And I'd like to pause now to discuss with Commander Caccivio what I can discuss of that.
[Off the record.]

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. After a brief one-minute break, we are back on the record continuing the narrative description by Commander Pfeifer.

LCDR PFEIFER: I'm Lieutenant Commander

Pfeifer.

I went -- I went aft and got a report from the Machinery Division leading chief petty officer who reported to me some limitations on the shaft. However, these limitations didn't prevent us from aiding people in the water, and once I face-to-faced that report, I believe I passed that along to the crew that there were no injuries, no penetration of our hull, but there was some damage to our propulsion train in that we could continue to operate safely and recover people if that was needed.

We -- I went -- I do specifically remember talking to the CO on the bridge about this, and I wanted him to know that -- what we could and we felt like we couldn't do with the ship speed.

We continued for hours, and I ensured both scopes were manned and we were looking for people in the water when we -- we were looking hard. We wanted to recover people, but they were in life rafts, and with the CO on the bridge, we -- we discussed this and I actually observed us approaching people in the life raft, and with the hull being round and the waves and we were bobbling up like this, the life rafts are circular in nature and as we were generating a very big height difference from the life rafts, it almost appeared that they could tip over. And I recommended to the CO -- I think he probably came to the same conclusion -- that we give the life raft some room and that the people in the life rafts would be safer being picked up by a smaller boat later rather than us trying to get them on our round hull and then trying to get them up this rope ladder on the side of the sail.

And that didn't mean -- I stood there, and my safety swimmers, I had them ready right below the bridge hatch in the command passageway ready to go up if we saw somebody in the water, but we made the decision that the people in the life raft would be better served by the ships that were coming out, and we had word at this time that if there weren't already helicopters there, they are on the way and the ships were in the neighborhood of 20 minutes away, as I recall.

We continued for hours and hours, and I often checked on the scope. I took turns on the scope looking for people in the water, and they were manned for hours. We continued the search. It almost -- if I understood the radio traffic, it was, you know, you are not required to continue to search, and, you know, we said we're staying and we're going to find some people in the water and we were determined to aid in any way we could.

That's how I recall.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Good. Thank you for that. This is Tom Roth-Roffy.

Could you give us your general impressions of the SAR efforts that were made by others involved in the emergency response?

LCDR PFEIFER: They were -- Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer. They were effective, and they successfully recovered people. They communicated the numbers of individuals that we were very concerned with, and so we felt we had accurate information that there were some people not recovered. They were updating us on the injuries, and to my recollection, the only injury I heard was a collar bone problem.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And how were you getting that information or how did you get the information that there was an injured person in the life raft?

LCDR PFEIFER: There is a bridge-to-bridge radio monitor in the control room where I would periodically be, and if I didn't hear it, someone would update me as I walked through if some word came out while I was attending to checking on damage or wherever I was running off to or assisting with the radio message.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you please describe the ship's protocol for rendering assistance to survivors in a situation like the sinking of the fishing vessel? Do you have a written procedure or protocol?

LCDR PFEIFER: I can say I've never been involved in one before.

We have procedures for a man overboard which would lend itself to this, and part of that procedure is assembling the man-overboard party in the crew's mess, which is what we did.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, to your knowledge, the ship doesn't have a rendering assistance procedure, per se, other than the man overboard?

LCDR STONE: Don't -- could I have a minute please?

[Pause.]

 $\mbox{\sc LCDR}$ PFEIFER: I would like to not answer that question.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: That's fine.

Do you have a station bill that would describe the duties of the various crew members that were involved in this sort of an evolution? Do you have a different name for that sort of an evolution? For example, "rescue and assistance," is that a phrase you are familiar with? I am not trying to --

LCDR PFEIFER: I would rather not answer that question.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You don't -- not familiar with that term?

LCDR STONE: He didn't say that.

UNIDENTIFIED: This is Commander -- at that 2 point, it is your goal to try and figure out how to best phrase this question and [inaudible] what the bill 3 would be called? Is that what you are trying to do? 5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yeah. Essentially, I am just trying to find out --6 7 UNIDENTIFIED: [Inaudible] search and rescue. 8 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Search and rescue bill. 9 Okay. 10 Are you -- so does the submarine have a 11 search and rescue bill? 12 LCDR PFEIFER: I'd rather not answer that 13 question. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Has the submarine practiced 14 15 drills and training in rendering assistance in 16 situations similar to this? 17 LCDR PFEIFER: The ship has practiced and trained on an event which I am familiar with -- and I 18 19 am not familiar with what you keep referring to -- is man overboard, and we do this numerous times and we've 20 21 done it. That's the guidelines of how we responded to 22 this situation. 23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you recall what the 24 required periodicity for drills -- a man overboard drill is for your submarine? 25 26 LCDR PFEIFER: I do not recall. 27 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: That's about all I have. I would like to pass the questioning to the 28 29 next interviewer. MR. WOODY: Good afternoon. I am Bill Woody 30 31 from NTSB. 32 Do you recall who the OOD was that went to 33 the bridge? Was it the engineer? 34 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir, it was. MR. WOODY: And his name? Is that -- what is 35 his name, please? 36 Lieutenant Commander Meador. 37 LCDR PFEIFER: MR. WOODY: N-e-t-t-e-r? 38 M-e -- you wrote "n," but it's 39 LCDR PFEIFER: пМ. п 40 41 MR. WOODY: пΜ. п LCDR PFEIFER: M-e-a-d, I believe, o-r. 42 43 MR. WOODY: Meador. You mentioned having people on the 44 45 periscopes. Who were they? 46 LCDR PFEIFER: I can recall two specifically. 47 MR. WOODY: All right. 48 LCDR PFEIFER: One, Lieutenant Pritchett, and, one, Lieutenant Dukette. 49 50 MR. WOODY: P-r-i-t-c-h-e-t, Pritchet? Spelling isn't my strong --51 LCDR PFEIFER: MR. WOODY: Okay. That's -- as long as 52 that's close enough. 53 54 LCDR PFEIFER: P-r-i-t-t-c --MR. WOODY: H-e-t. That's phonetically close 55

to what you said.

And Lieutenant -- what was the other, please? LCDR PFEIFER: Dukette, D-u-k-e-t-t-e.

MR. WOODY: T-t. Okay.

At any time, did you get any reports that people had been seen in the water?

LCDR PFEIFER: No, sir, I haven't.

MR. WOODY: Did you check to see if they had yet seen anybody in the water? What I am getting at is did the lookouts on the periscopes ever find anyone or sight anybody in the water?

LCDR PFEIFER: Not to my knowledge, sir. We -- we did -- I think we even reported in a message that we saw eight people or 16 people, some number in the life rafts themselves.

MR. WOODY: Life rafts, mm-hmm.

LCDR PFEIFER: But nobody in the water.

MR. WOODY: In the water.

Would you describe the weather conditions at that time, if you can recall them?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. It was sunny, sir. There were some -- there were waves. It wasn't a -- by no means was the sea glassy. It was wavy, like the waves were coming over the forward escape trunk, and --

MR. WOODY: Could you give an estimate of the height of them and wind direction or wind force?

 $\mbox{\sc LCDR}$ PFEIFER: I would not like to speculate on that, sir.

MR. WOODY: Okay, fine. How was visibility? Could you clearly see the horizon, or was there any haze or cloud covering?

LCDR PFEIFER: Sir, there was perhaps a very light haze. It was -- I remember later seeing from this distance Oahu Diamondhead, but the lower you got, there was some -- some haze. So it wasn't exactly clear.

MR. WOODY: Okay.

LCDR PFEIFER: But visibility was -- was -- MR. WOODY: But in your area --

LCDR STONE: Could I have just a quick

second?

MR. WOODY: Sure.

[Pause.]

LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I would --

MR. WOODY: But in your area, you could see people in the water without --

LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, yes, sir.

MR. WOODY: -- impairment?

LCDR PFEIFER: And I want to clarify this.

This is my observation from the bridge after the collision.

MR. WOODY: After the collision.

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

MR. WOODY: At what time after the collision might this observation be? Hour? Half an hour?

LCDR PFEIFER: It -- probably 15 minutes, sir.

MR. WOODY: Fifteen minutes.

We had a very fine introduction into the party of swimmers that were put together from Chief Streyle. He said that -- I believe he was some sort of supervisor supervising top side if there was swimmers to go top side, and I think he related that there were four swimmers. Does that jibe with your recollection?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. I believe we eventually got up to six.

MR. WOODY: Up to six.

LCDR PFEIFER: And when in the command passageway, I think we eventually had more than four. Four would be the minimum number that I remember. There may have been more eventually.

MR. WOODY: Do you have any recollection -- and you might not because you weren't on the bridge -- of attempts to find a means to communicate with the rafts, people in the rafts?

LCDR PFEIFER: The -- at -- at one point, the officer of the deck was looking for someone who spoke Chinese, and so I made an announcement requesting someone who spoke Chinese. Later, we found out that was --

MR. WOODY: Might it have been Japanese, or was it Chinese?

LCDR PFEIFER: He did say Chinese, and that's what I asked for. And so I find out later --

MR. WOODY: Did you learn later -- did you learn later that it was a Japanese ship?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir, and --

MR. WOODY: Was it soon enough to make an announcement for a Japanese or was it --

LCDR PFEIFER: This was like they were recovered already and we --

MR. WOODY: Okay, or back in the rafts. LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

MR. WOODY: About what time, if you call recall, were the people picked up by the rafts? In other words, what time was the last people picked up to your recollection? And I realize we can get this exact time from the Coast Guard and Navy, but it might be --

LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, yeah. I would -- I hate to contradict the real answer, but it -- I mean, let me just throw it --

MR. WOODY: A couple hours?

LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, no. It was quicker than that. It was, you know --

MR. WOODY: If you don't know -- okay, right. That's fair enough.

LCDR PFEIFER: I hate to speculate. What I just described to you, when they got there, they were just picking them up, and it wasn't drawn out over hours. It was -- they had a little boat and they were

going around. I think they checked each raft, you know, to make sure there weren't just people laying in there who weren't waving, and they got them out of there.

MR. WOODY: And you mentioned that there was some radio and control. You could talk to the search and rescue people arriving on the scene. That was a radio. What channel was that on? Channel 16?

LCDR PFEIFER: That -- that radio has ability to scan several channels, and I -- I'm not sure what all channels. I didn't check it --

MR. WOODY: But you could hear the --LCDR PFEIFER: -- but I know it was 16. I mean, that would be --

MR. WOODY: Okay. Were you talking on the radio, or was someone else?

LCDR PFEIFER: No, sir. I didn't talk on the radio.

MR. WOODY: I digressed a little bit. We had Tuchay Tood [ph] tell us about the swimmers. Can you give us any information on what Chief Streyle's responsibilities might have been had you had to put swimmers into the water?

LCDR PFEIFER: He -- with swimmers being able to get in the water, we would have had what's called a Jacob's Ladder so that they can -- instead of just rolling off, up this round hull, it's another wooden ladder with ropes. He would have attended to that. He would have been a safety supervisor with a couple of other gentlemen in harnesses to help people up and down without losing them over the side.

He would have -- probably would have also -- I would have gone up there, too, with -- but with some means of communicating with the bridge to let them know what was going on so that we didn't harm anybody.

MR. WOODY: Was there any great risk in putting a swimmer into the water from the ship that day with the sea state and --

LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, yes, sir.

MR. WOODY: Can you give us a -- have you had any experience with putting people into the water and --

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir, we do. We've had numerous swim calls on days much calmer than this can get in real trouble, and particularly during a swim call, we would put the ship so that we had lee side where the seas were protected and it would be calm and then we would have a rougher side, and when occasionally someone would stray to the rough side, there were times when we had to send in our rescue swimmers to help them get out. And what would happen is the waves would just kind of intimidate them, and when they got near the hull, they were really intimidated. So they had a tendency to panic, and we'd send a rescue swimmer in and escort them around to the

other side. That happened about once or twice. MR. WOODY: Now, your perspective was that by looking through the periscope. Did you ever go up -to a certain point. After that, did you go up to the bridge and look out? Yes, sir. LCDR PFEIFER: MR. WOODY: You did. LCDR PFEIFER: And I -- and, for example, the waves that were coming over the weapon shipping hatch -- excuse me -- the forward escape trunk hatch --MR. WOODY: Right. LCDR PFEIFER: -- we would never have had swim call with that, and that would have -- you know, ijust devastated the ship with all that water coming So this was worse than the incident I just described to you with much calmer seas and guys getting in trouble --MR. WOODY: I see. LCDR PFEIFER: -- near the ship. Okay. MR. WOODY: I'll tell you, I would not LCDR PFEIFER: have hesitated for a second to send our rescue swimmers in. MR. WOODY: If you found people in the water LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. MR. WOODY: -- if necessary. LCDR PFEIFER: They were going. that.

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I knew that. If we found anybody there, we're qoinq. We weren't going to send them in there just to go swimming --

MR. WOODY: I appreciate that.-

LCDR PFEIFER: -- but we needed a target.

MR. WOODY: Okay.

LCDR PFEIFER: And if there was anybody there, they were going to get them.

Would they have been subject to MR. WOODY: some risk and -- if they had gone into the water, just by the bouncing against the side of the ship that you described with your --

LCDR PFEIFER: Just any time you are in open ocean and rough seas, I don't care if you have fins on or you're trained, there is some risk. Yes, sir.

MR. WOODY: Okay. How would the swimmers be Would they -- could you describe that to us? attired? You mentioned fins, for example.

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. They're in shorts, and other than that, I'm not sure what they were wearing.

MR. WOODY: The water was warm enough, they wouldn't have had to have any kind of wet suit or anything like that?

LCDR PFEIFER: No, sir.

MR. WOODY: Okay. And you knew this ahead of time?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. We've -- we've had swim calls in these, you know --MR. WOODY: In this water, this time of year? LCDR PFEIFER: Well, yeah. I mean, I don't recall exactly when, but I go swimming and I'm not concerned with the --MR. WOODY: Again, how were they outfitted? Did they have any kind of a --

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LCDR PFEIFER: They were in shorts and no shirts. I can't remember if they had some kind of a -what we call a swimmer's inflatable jacket. They probably had that. I don't recall.

MR. WOODY: Did you have any kind of a harness with a lifeline to the swimmers like that? Yeah. Definitely, we were LCDR PFEIFER: going to -- if people were going in, they were going to have -- be tended with a line. We weren't going to just [inaudible].

MR. WOODY: Okay. How many people on the deck would be tending a line like that to a swimmer under those conditions? How many people?

LCDR PFEIFER: I don't want to speculate, sir.

MR. WOODY: Well, you had to make a judgment call that day. I just -- would it be a matter of two, three, four, or more, or -- that's all right.

LCDR PFEIFER: I'd have to make the call when I saw --

MR. WOODY: Oh, when you saw the conditions, right.

LCDR PFEIFER: From that perspective, at that time.

MR. WOODY: I will reconsider that question. That is a good answer.

I think the last thing I have about being top side, the party that hypothetically -- you had to go in the water. How many people would be involved? You mentioned there would be one swimmer. There would be a couple of people attending. Where would those tenders Would they be beside this Jacob's Ladder, or would they be up on the flat of the hull or --

LCDR PFEIFER: They -- top side, there is a safety track --

> MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

LCDR PFEIFER: -- and their harness --MR. WOODY: Right.

LCDR PFEIFER: -- would be tied onto it with a [inaudible], and they would have been there because we don't want them going in the water --

> MR. WOODY: Exactly.

LCDR PFEIFER: Then itself would be very dangerous, but -- in that condition, but you are asking hypothetically, and that's hard to answer. You know, it was --

MR. WOODY: I certainly understand.

LCDR PFEIFER: Because the decision was made not to do that for very good reason. So, to say, well, what if you did do that, it is hard for me to answer because --

MR. WOODY: Right. I just -- I asked -- I thought if you had done any planning at that time, had any general answer, you might think, well, we had two people we were going to hook into the track, and they would be our people supporting the swimmer, and we have another couple of people up on somewhere and that sort of thing, but that's all right.

LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

MR. WOODY: I'm asking what you -- what you thought.

Well, let's go around the room and see if anybody else has anything because there's a lot of things about the search and rescue that you did right, and we'd like to find out about those as well, so appreciate learning about what you did.

I think it's important that we find out that, you know -- that you made a judgment call in this procedure, that it's through a judgment involved you were looking for people in the water, your statement that you had to send somebody in. This is an important piece of information for us to have in the public record. So we appreciate it.

I'll -- I think that's all the questions I have at this moment.

MR. STRAUCH: I am Barry Strauch.

You were in -- in -- is it classroom training on February 6th? Do you remember --

LCDR PFEIFER: Can I look at that just -- the dates are real hard for me to remember all this stuff right now.

MR. STRAUCH: This one right here, what kind of training was that?

LCDR PFEIFER: That -- okay, I remember that. That was training on Tomahawk missile casualties.

MR. STRAUCH: You said that there was a summary, and you had a finite period of time to help --

I believe you said the -LCDR PFEIFER: I don't believe I said that.
MR. STRAUCH: Oh, you don't? Okay. So, if I

ask you to elaborate on that -
LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not sure to what you're

referring, sir.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. I believe you were referring --

LCDR PFEIFER: If [inaudible] to the nuclear reactor, I could stay out there until my fuel ran out.

MR. STRAUCH: I believe you were referring to after the -- after the collision. You -- you -- your vessel was about to render assistance, and I believe you said, but being a submarine, we had a finite period

of offering assistance.

LCDR PFEIFER: I think you misunderstood what I was saying.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Could you -- then could you clarify my understanding of it? Do you remember it or --

LCDR PFEIFER: If there was any assistance to be rendered that I thought we could have done, we would have done it --

MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

LCDR PFEIFER: -- regardless of the time. I would have stayed there. I'd be out there right now.

CAPT KYLE: This is Captain Kyle.

I think, as I recall the question, it was there would be a finite period of time before you could render assistance after the collision.

LCDR PFEIFER: Oh.
MR. STRAUCH: Oh.
LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.
MR. STRAUCH: Okay.
LCDR PFEIFER: What -MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

PANEL MEMBER: Yes. There was a prep time. LCDR PFEIFER: When the ship is submerged, the hatches are all shut. When we are on the surface, you have to open, in the case of the bridge, two hatches. You have to get the right guy up there. There's some things he needs to assemble to go up there. The ship has to turn and get in position to help people out, and so I am not going to speculate on how long that is, but there is that -- those kind of things has to happen, and I understand things kept coming.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Thank you.

How many VIPs were escorted out of the Control Room after the event?

LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall. MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Thank you.

LT JOHNSON: Sir, this is Lieutenant Johnson with the Coast Guard.

Do you recall a time after the accident where the decision was made that you could better serve the people in the life rafts by standing off from them and just observing them rather than being -- trying to get closer to them?

LCDR STONE: I think he referred to that in his original speech, but can I direct you kind of -- is this when you are referring to getting close to them and the sub bobbing up and down? Is this the period of time in which you are talking about?

LT JOHNSON: Yes.

LCDR STONE: Does that better help clarify where you're --

LCDR PFEIFER: And to answer it, I can't honestly say that's when it happened, but I do have

that vision in my head of us coming very close to a life raft and seeing a guy, you know, looking at us with a scared look, and it was like, you know, that's definitely not how we want to do it.

LT JOHNSON: Right. You had how many? had both of the periscopes manned during this time? there a point where you can get so close to an object in the water with a periscope, it becomes irrelevant, you can't actually see it through the periscope?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. They don't go straight

down.

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LT JOHNSON: Right.

LCDR PFEIFER: How close, realistically, if there's nothing that the guys on the bridge -- I mean, they would have been, "Hey, how's it going?"

LT JOHNSON: Sure.

LCDR PFEIFER: I mean, it was that close. goes pretty far down, but not -- not straight down. There is a point of a blind spot, but it's, you know, a stone's throw from the bridge.

CDR CACCIVIO: Commander Caccivio.

Real quick, I don't think anybody construed the fact that the target became irrelevant, which is the term you used. You asked if the target became irrelevant because it came within the field of view, it went outside the field of view because it was so close to the submarine.

LT JOHNSON: Oh, okay. No, that wasn't what I was trying to convey.

I was wondering if backing off allowed them to have more eyes monitoring people in the water because it brought the periscopes into play more. Putting some more distance between then was where I was Is that -- would that be a fair -going with that.

> LCDR PFEIFER: What am I agreeing to? [Laughter.]

CDR CACCIVIO: I just wanted to make sure that you did not agree that the target became irrelevant because it became so close to the ship, it left your field of vision due to the scopes --

> LCDR PFEIFER: Right.

LT JOHNSON: And I'm asking if backing the submarine away from the people in the water gave the people that were manning the periscopes a better view of the survivors in the water to help keep track of them.

Does that make sense what I am asking, Commander?

LCDR PFEIFER: You are discussing life rafts, right?

> Yes. LT JOHNSON:

LCDR PFEIFER: So I'm not sure how to answer your question.

> LT JOHNSON: That's fine.

LTJG KUSANO: Lieutenant Kusano, Coast Guard.

Just a couple questions. When the submarine was surfaced, at what point, or at all, was there any communication with the crew members of the Ehime Maru from the bridge?

LCDR PFEIFER: I am aware of none.

LTJG KUSANO: So, at any point, was -- did they count how many survivors there were or how many they thought might still be in the water? The bridge seemed --

LCDR PFEIFER: Are you referring to the things I heard on the bridge-to-bridge radio?

LTJG KUSANO: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. We were hearing reports. I'm trying to remember the numbers now. I don't want to misquote myself. I think -- I think -- I can't remember the numbers for sure, but I did hear these numbers, and we were looking for more people, and it was -- it was 10 people and then later we were looking for nine people.

LTJG KUSANO: That's all I have. LCDR SANTOMAURO: This is Lieutenant Commander Santomauro, sir.

After the collision and we had the periscopes up, did we rotate? Did -- was the perivis activated and possibly did we have a tape made?

LCDR PFEIFER: There was no tape made, and the perivis was on.

LCDR SANTOMAURO: It was on?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. LCDR SANTOMAURO: Okay. Di

LCDR SANTOMAURO: Okay. Did we have any -- any difficulties at all with number-one or number-two periscope turning toward field of view, optics? I mean, do you have any sense of any problems?

LCDR PFEIFER: Sir, not that I'm aware of.
LCDR SANTOMAURO: No? So they were working fine?

LCDR PFEIFER: To my knowledge.

LCDR SANTOMAURO: Once you were up and you were actually looking around for survivors in the water, could you tell basically did you have any estimate as to what the visible range was in that area? I mean, was it -- you could actually see the entire area? I mean --

LCDR PFEIFER: There was -- there was an area of debris, and there was an area in that area with these life rafts and there was open ocean. So we -- I didn't drive the ship, but what I observed was we kind of stayed on the outside of that and looked around both outside and in the -- in the area of the debris.

LCDR SANTOMAURO: And before -- before -- actually, before the collision, there were three contacts, Sierra-10, I believe, 12, and 13. Were they in the area after the collision? I mean to be able to render assistance -- I mean, I have no idea where they were at.

LCDR PFEIFER: I don't want to refer to those Sierra contacts, but I will -- there was -- I observed nobody not rendering assistance that could have. I don't know what -- it wasn't like people were running away saying "I am going to leave these people alone." I am under the impression that if anyone would have seen -- seen or been aware or notified on the bridge there was a problem, they would have rendered assistance.

LCDR SANTOMAURO: That's all I have.

CAPT KYLE: This is Captain Kyle, SUBPAC.

A few questions here. The individuals you

A few questions here. The individuals you mentioned were on the periscopes to do the initial search, there were two officers?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. And I'd like to say those were two officers I remember being on scopes. I can't remember when -- when -- if that was the first two or who, but --

CAPT KYLE: Okay.

LCDR PFEIFER: Those memories are hard right now.

CAPT KYLE: Okay. Did we -- how many lookouts went up to the bridge? Do you remember when you went up there?

LCDR PFEIFER: I recall one, sir.

CAPT KYLE: One lookout? So there was -- the captain was up there --

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

CAPT KYLE: -- and officer of the deck --

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

CAPT KYLE: -- and lookout -- one lookout?

All have binoculars?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. To my recollection, I definitely looked to make sure they had binoculars.

CAPT KYLE: Do you remember if they had --

LCDR PFEIFER: Because I was reminding them, "remember what you're doing up here, don't look at helicopters. You are looking for people in the water."

CAPT KYLE: Yeah. Do you remember if there were safety appliances like life ring and stuff up on the bridge? That's normally part of the bridge bag. Do you remember if it was up there?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. The life ring is held right below the bridge, and I didn't verify it being there or not. I mean, at this time, I don't recall.

CAPT KYLE: You don't remember? Okay.

Did you set up a plan for rotation of people on the scopes, people getting tired pulling those things around? Was there a rotation through the night?

LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't establish a plan. However, there were different people, different men on the scopes regularly.

CAPT KYLE: When you checked there, were you satisfied that the people there were qualified to

 operate the scope? I mean, it was not --LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir, I was.

CAPT KYLE: I know there's probably a lot of

LCDR PFEIFER: If I wasn't, I would have switchhed them out in a heartbeat. We were --

CAPT KYLE: I figured there is probably a lot of effort on -- everybody probably wanted to help. So I just wanted to make sure that there was some -- okay.

You mentioned the Ward Room was ready to receive injured personnel. Was a corpsman on board?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. He was in the Ward Room and ready to -- he was the guy I observed, and we made eye contact in case -- I'm ready.

CAPT KYLE: You mentioned there was no -really, you summarized in your statement there was
really no -- after your initial damage assessment,
collection information on the -- potential damage to
your own ship, there was no -- nothing that prevented
the ship from staying at sea. It was not an immediate
threat, but you mentioned there was some propulsion
train issue. Was there a limitation placed on the
ship's speed because of that limit, limitation?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, and we limited ourselves. We could have gone more, but I informed the captain that above a two-thirds bell, we observed a wobbling of the shaft.

CAPT KYLE: Okay. And --

LCDR PFEIFER: So we were concerned, you know, if you don't need to go above two-thirds, Captain, keep it below two-thirds, and one-third is probably the best unless you have somewhere to go.

CAPT KYLE: Two-thirds is about what speed for the members of the board here?

LCDR PFEIFER: That's on the surface slightly less than 10 knots.

CAPT KYLE: One-third is about?

LCDR PFEIFER: About 5 knots, a little under that on the surface.

CAPT KYLE: Okay. During the night -- well, after the accident, did -- did your ship receive direction or instructions from anyone else on how -- where to search or how to search? Is there a -- you know, search this quadrant, or were you pretty much on your independent -- operating independently as far as you know?

LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't receive any specific direction.

CAPT KYLE: You don't remember being -talking to the surface ship that came out there or anything like that?

LCDR PFEIFER: I don't, no, sir.

CAPT KYLE: You don't.

You mentioned you had a marine radio monitor going on or a marine radio capability. Is that -- is

that connection to marine radio -- did you -- did you 2 take the antenna top side, or were you using one of the ship's antennas, one of the ship's main antennas for 3 communications? 5 LCDR PFEIFER: No extra antenna was taken top 6 side. 7 CAPT KYLE: Extra antenna was taken top side? 8 LCDR PFEIFER: It was not. CAPT KYLE: It was not. 9 No, sir. 10 LCDR PFEIFER: 11 CAPT KYLE: So do you know what -- is that a 12 normal connection, or is that a special patch that you have from that marine radio to the ship's antenna? 13 I would have to ask that to LCDR PFEIFER: 14 the radio man, sir. 15 CAPT KYLE: You just -- okay. 16 17 Did you raise the radar after the collision? LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir, we did, and it 18 19 failed to work and --CAPT KYLE: Failed to work. 20 21 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. 22 CAPT KYLE: How about Faruno? Did you put 23 that up? I remember a discussion with LCDR PFEIFER: 24 the captain -- or the OOD had -- I asked him about that 25 26 because I saw the radar. I was interested in getting 27 the radar going. I saw it up and not spinning. was a problem with the radar, and later, we got the 28 29 Faruno up, but it -- and it was functional. 30 CAPT KYLE: The Faruno was working. So did we ever get the BPS-15 radar to work 31 32 or --LCDR PFEIFER: 33 No. CAPT KYLE: To the best of your knowledge? 34 LCDR PFEIFER: I believe it never did work, 35 36 sir. Not on your list. 37 CAPT KYLE: UNIDENTIFIED: You didn't test that sensor --38 We are going to go look at that 39 CAPT KYLE: sensor, find out what's wrong with that. 40 41 UNIDENTIFIED: Sir, may I clarify something? The BPS-15 radar was investigated and corrected upon 42 return to port. 43 CAPT KYLE: Okay. We need to understand what 44 the problem was. We just need to get background data 45 46 on it. In your statement, you mentioned the 1MC and 47 48 SATHICOM. Would you explain what those are for the board members? 49 50 LCDR PFEIFER: SATHICOM is a UHF secure voice method of communication with the type commander. 51 CAPT KYLE: Just the type commander? Is that 52 53

anyone -- I guess any submarine listening to SATHICOM

Well, it's a frequency that

LCDR PFEIFER:

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can copy, but I know that's how we talk to the SUBPAC watch officer.

CAPT KYLE: Okay. You were thinking at the time if you had to put a swimmer in the water to recover someone who was in distress, immediate distress. Was your plan to recover the swimmer or the person in distress back to the Greeneville, or was there a plan? Is that what the plan was?

LCDR PFEIFER: Initially, we were, and that was the plan. Yes, sir.

CAPT KYLE: Okay. That's all I have. Thank you.

CDR CACCIVIO: This is Commander Caccivio.

Can you briefly describe for me what propulsion capabilities you had available to you for maneuvering in that type of situation?

LCDR PFEIFER: Well, for maneuvering, there is the propulsion shaft, also the outboard. It is the secondary propulsion motor, and I'm fairly certain that that was also employed and helped turn and direct the ship in along the life rafts.

CDR CACCIVIO: Okay. In this type of close-in maneuvering situation, which one of those modes of propulsion would you most likely be using, and could you kind of explain to us why?

LCDR PFEIFER: You would use them both. If you saw a guy in trouble in the distance, you would use the main engines to get in the vicinity of him, and then as you got close to him, you would provide him a lee, like I talked about in the swim call, and recover him on the lee [ph] side where he would be protected. And to turn the ship like that, you would use the SPM, which we refer to as outboard.

CDR CACCIVIO: Based on the submarine's unique configuration for the screw relative to the rudder and the single screw, would you say it's difficult or easy for maneuvering alongside life rafts?

LCDR PFEIFER: I don't want to compare it to anything that I am not familiar with. So --

CDR CACCIVIO: Okay. Let me think about how to rephrase this, then.

CAPT KYLE: This is Captain Kyle.

Let me try this on. How does the submarine -- describe the submarine's ability to back. Is it reliable?

LCDR PFEIFER: The way I refer to the way a submarine backs is it backs the way it wants to, and you can put the rudder over in a certain way and think you are going to be able to back to port and it backs to starboard. And we've proved that a lot of times on my ship. Ships in the past, when I've driven them, it's difficult to steer in the astern direction.

CDR CACCIVIO: When operating in the -- thank you. This is Commander Caccivio again.

When operating in the vicinity of a pier

which is a closed quarters navigation exercise, do submarines routinely do this without a tug?

LCDR PFEIFER: No. I've never done it without a tuq.

CDR CACCIVIO: Why do you consider a tug necessary?

LCDR PFEIFER: It's the ship -- the ability to move sideways into a pier, it just doesn't have it. You need another point, a force to push it. I'll use my hat as an example. If you are pushing on the aft end with the SPM which is in the aft end, you would just rotate the ship and you wouldn't be able to push it parallel to the pier. That is some of the difficulty in controlling the ship that I think you are asking about.

CDR CACCIVIO: Would these difficulties be the same problems you would experience if trying to maneuver alongside a tug -- I'm sorry -- alongside a life raft?

LCDR PFEIFER: It certainly would be. CDR CACCIVIO: Okay. I'm done.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Does anyone have any questions in light of anybody else's questions?
MR. WOODY: Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED: We can only make two rounds. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Normally, we make the second

round.

This is Tom Roth-Roffy.

How many people can comfortably fit on the

bridge?

LCDR PFEIFER: I will tell you, we were pretty full with three. Now, when we have what's called a flying bridge and we have these additional poles that we can set up to get more people, that takes quite a while and it takes some resources. We didn't do that immediately.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And if you -- is this something that you rig out, so I understand it, and how long does it take to rig it andhow many additional people could be put on this flying bridge? I'm not understanding what that's all about.

LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. The flying bridge. How many people additionally -- you could probably safely put five other people up there. It is a system of poles, and even that's not real safe, particularly in the open ocean. You're -- we wouldn't generally rig the flying bridge. That's something -- you'd rig it on the way in or out of port. In the open ocean, if somebody is up there, a wave comes over the bridge -- which I got [inaudible] with a wave later on that night, you know. That's not a good place to be hit with waves while you are standing on top of the bridge, even with those poles up there.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: How long does it take in time to rig that arrangement?

LCDR PFEIFER: Twenty minutes, plus or minus 10.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. You had indicated that you have some kind of collision procedures that were executed after the collision. Is that -- does that have a name, out of collision?

LCDR PFEIFER: It is a collision procedure. It is a casualty procedure, and it is in the SSM.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And you said that somebody -- you had conversed with somebody about this that had done the checklist. Who was that person?

LCDR PFEIFER: That man was Senior Chief Crist [ph].

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And what is his position on the submarine?

LCDR PFEIFER: He's the -- he's -- it's kind of an awkward situation with him. He's recently been assigned to us, and he is just an experienced guy with some navigation background. He came to us from another submarine for a short period of time on temporary duty.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And how would you spell his name?

LCDR PFEIFER: C-r-i-s-t is the best way I can spell it. That may not be right.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you talk about the two radar systems? You mentioned the Faruno. How is that different from the other radar?

LCDR PFEIFER: The BPS-15 radar is something that can be employed immediately, almost immediately. You raise it, test it, and get it operational relatively quickly. It's part of the ship structure.

The Faruno is kind of an add-on system that you carry up to the bridge and you tie it onto the NAV ID mast, one of our masts, and it -- and it -- rather than having a permanent location, it is the temporary-type system. The cables come down the bridge hatches, and it connects to a monitor in the control room.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And you called that first one a BPS-15?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, BPS, and -- sorry about that acronym there for you.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: BPS-15.

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And the antenna is permanently mounted on the super structure?

LCDR PFEIFER: It's in the sail, just forward against the OOD.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: In the sail.

LCDR PFEIFER: It comes out of the sail. It's [inaudible] in.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you describe the steps needed to activate the BPS-15 radar?

LCDR PFEIFER: It needs to be -- there is a pin mechanism in the bridge trunk that prevents it from

coming loose while you are going fast underneath, and so there's -- actually, we have a modification that's got two pins and those pins need to be removed. Then it needs to be raised, and the specifics that the radar operator has to go through, I'm not familiar with, but it's -- it's a matter of minutes.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Do you have to -- do you have to open up your hatches to get up into the sail to do that or --

LCDR PFEIFER: The lower bridge hatch -- there's two of them. The lower one has to be open to unpin the radar.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And that takes about how long? Do you have to be on the surface to do that?

LCDR PFEIFER: It's more cautious to be on the surface to do that. If you have a need to, you can open up the lower bridge hatch and you would do that at a shallow depth because those two hatches are what's keeping the water out.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Shallow depth being what, less than 150 feet or so?

LCDR PFEIFER: If it was me and I had to go in there for some reason, we'd be at 150 feet if it wasn't convenient to be at periscope depth.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So you move these pins from -- is it a shaft or something that extends upward that has the --

LCDR PFEIFER: I'll be honest. I'm not really familiar with our pins.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I'm just trying to get an idea of --

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- what it looked like and the arrangement of it.

CAPT KYLE: This is Captain Kyle.

If you want more clarification for the board, if necessary, we can go down and show you how that's -MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I'd be interested in seeing that, Captain.

CAPT KYLE: -- see how it's done.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Thank you for that.

Okay. That's about all I have now. I would like to continue with the second round.

MR. WOODY: How long does it take to get the -- Bill Woody, NTSB. How long does it take to get the SPM of the outboard? Is that right, SPM?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

MR. WOODY: What does SPM stand for? LCDR PFEIFER: Secondary propulsion motor.

MR. WOODY: Okay.

LCDR PFEIFER: And within 5 minutes.

MR. WOODY: Within 5 minutes.

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir, in that

neighborhood.

MR. WOODY: Is this a lowering process, or

can you explain what it does?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. You have to restore power to it with an electric plant shift, and then it's lowered, it's tested, and then it's shifted to operate remotely from the helm in the control room.

MR. WOODY: I see.

LCDR PFEIFER: So, in the sequence of things, different people would be different rates, but 5 -- 5 minutes is a conservative amount of time.

MR. WOODY: Okay. And is it omnidirectional? LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. You can train it 360 degrees.

MR. WOODY: And what kind of horsepower are we speaking of?

LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall that, sir. MR. WOODY: That's all right.

I've heard from one of the officers about if you had to bring an injured person or someone who could not climb up the Jacob's Ladder on the sale -- a hypothetical question. If you were to bring somebody aboard the submarine who was unable to go up the Jacob's Ladder, what kind of rigging would you do to bring the person up to the stop of the sail?

LCDR PFEIFER: As a hypothetical question, I'd use some ropes and some kind of pulley system and get them up there. I'd get them up there. Put them on a harness. Put them on a rope, you know. It might not be a pleasant ride, but I think I could get them up there.

MR. WOODY: Okay. Would you use the mast to

LCDR PFEIFER: There was some discussion of tying a rope to a mast and then that would be used to get them out of the water and up, and there were guys working in parallel with that idea. I didn't stop them from thinking about that and formulating in their heads how to do that. That wasn't -- we never had a situation where that was needed, and I've never seen that done.

MR. WOODY: Okay. You never conducted any drills along this line?

LCDR PFEIFER: Not with a mast rope rig.

MR. WOODY: I think I have no more questions on the search and rescue.

PANEL MEMBER: [Inaudible.]

MR. WOODY: I could do that -- well, I could do that at the very end or I could do it right now.

Every time we have an accident, we talk to people involved in any way. We have a series of personal questions we ask, and one is a 72-hour history which you have provided in your form here.

The other is some questions such as age, for example. Might I take that?

LCDR PFEIFER: Thirty-seven.

MR. WOODY: And your height and weight?

LCDR PFEIFER: I am 6'2", 180 pounds. 2 MR. WOODY: How would you characterize your 3 health? LCDR PFEIFER: Good. 5 MR. WOODY: Are you taking any medication 6 prescribed by a physician? 7 LCDR PFEIFER: I am not. 8 MR. WOODY: Have you -- do you do any 9 self-medication such as over-the-counter pharmaceutical 10 or drugs? 11 LCDR PFEIFER: I do not. 12 MR. WOODY: Would you -- do you wear glasses? I do. I wear contact lenses. 13 LCDR PFEIFER: Contact lenses. MR. WOODY: 14 Are your eyes correctable to 20/20? 15 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes. 16 17 MR. WOODY: And can you read comfortably with your contact lenses? 18 19 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes. 20 MR. WOODY: And were you wearing your lenses 21 at the time of the accident? 22 LCDR PFEIFER: I was. MR. WOODY: I believe, last, have there been 23 any events in your life, say over the past few weeks, 24 within a month, that were significant to you, that 25 26 caused you to think about them such as anything of a 27 depressing nature, sad things, or anything, on the 28 other hand, that was exhilarating, any particularly happy, successful things? Have there been any highs, 29 30 lows in the past month in your life? LCDR PFEIFER: Well, this certainly ranks s 31 32 up there --MR. WOODY: Before this. Please, before 33 this. 34 35 Nothing besides this. LCDR PFEIFER: 36 MR. WOODY: We only ask this to try to see if somebody will come forward with something that may have 37 affected their performance at the time. 38 LCDR PFEIFER: I understand. 39 My counsel is recommending I let you know I 40 41 ran the marathon, and I raced in early December. I'm in good health. 42 43 MR. WOODY: Is that a 26-kilometer or miles or --44 45 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir, 26 miles, 26.2. 46 MR. WOODY: Twenty-six miles. What was your time? 47 48 LCDR PFEIFER: I got a 348 and some seconds. MR. WOODY: Okay. 49 50 CAPT KYLE: Do you want to hire for your 51 [inaudible] team? [Laughter.] 52 MR. WOODY: That's all the questions I have. 53 54 I want to thank you.

MR. STRAUCH: None for me.

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PANEL MEMBER: Counsel, would you entertain any questions before the sail orders? I mean, who arranged this VIP tour, who they were, who did the planning for what the schedule was and so forth?

LCDR STONE: I'm not so sure that's -- the XO is the best person to ask those questions of.

Can I have a minute with him?
[Pause.]

LCDR PETERSON: Lieutenant Commander Craig Peterson, Coast Guard.

Commander Pfeifer, if you could just share with us some of the days preceding up to this cruise and for scheduling and what you know of that, please?

LCDR PFEIFER: Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer.

I -- the scheduling of the -- of the cruise, which we refer to as the "VIP cruise," wasn't in my direct control, and I believe I first heard it proposed to our ship when we were in San Francisco. We were there previously. I don't recall the date. You can easily check that out. It was a couple of weeks ago. And it was proposed to us that we were being asked -and I heard this secondhand from the navigator who -who took the call from the squadron and said, "Hey, on Friday, we're" -- Friday, the 9th, I guess it was --"Hey, we're looking at scheduling you guys for a VIP cruise," and when that is, you know, well, who are there, and I don't -- I'm not sure I knew it then, but we did hear that maybe Admiral Kaneski [ph] was interested in us supporting this VIP cruise, and we think a lot of the admiral. And if that was true that he wanted us to do it, we'd be glad to do that and make that work in our schedule.

That week, if you noticed -- like on my schedule, there's a lot of training and lecture. That was a week set aside for lecture training, and so we worked it all out so that we could support the VIP cruise and get all the lectures in that we needed.

LCDR PETERSON: Did you know any of these VIPs that were coming on board?

LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't. We -- at some point, we heard Admiral Mackey was going to be with us, and then -- I didn't know who it was. I've since heard who he was, and I just -- to me, it's another admiral.

I don't know. And he -- he was coming, he wasn't coming, and then he wasn't sure, and then he decided not to come, I guess.

And, you know, I hate to -- I hate to tell you this. I'm just kind of hearing this secondhand and its speculation because to me "I'm getting underway and we are taking these guys out there, and we're glad to do it" and whether he came or not it didn't matter to me.

LCDR PETERSON: Had you done any of these since you've been on board?

LCDR PFEIFER: VIP cruises?

I mean, how

2 3 4

them.

LCDR PETERSON: Yeah.

LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. We've done a number of

LCDR PETERSON: Fairly common?

many have you done, do you think?

LCDR PFEIFER: You'd have to check the record, but --

LCDR PETERSON: Quarterly?

LCDR PFEIFER: Let me see. Let me -- maybe four. Not necessarily the same script from here in Hawaii. There was -- we took some from Santa Barbara to San Diego. I think we had done another one here. We took -- that's it. Maybe only -- maybe this was only our third one. It kind of seems like there was more. I don't recall.

PANEL MEMBER: Point of clarification on that question of how much time. I mean, how -- three cruises. How long have you been XO?

LCDR PFEIFER: I've been XO for 15 months.

So --

PANEL MEMBER: I don't have anything more. CAPT KYLE: Captain Kyle, SUBPAC.

Only one question. Did you -- did you have an agenda for this trip, or is there a plan of attack or a --

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. The -- I didn't specify a temporary standing order but I did have a plan of attack which you can kind of follow -in the plan of the day, and also verbally discussed it with a couple of individuals, "Hey, we're going to break these guys up into two groups, and you take this half and you take this half." So it wasn't like they were coming on board with no plan. It was a good plan, and it went through kind of a scripted routine.

CAPT KYLE: Okay. So you broke the group into halves, and then they had schedules laid out and the plan of the day for that Friday?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

CAPT KYLE: So that is how the crew is notified to expect angles and things that were coming up by the plan of day and by word of mouth to the action officers or --

LCDR PFEIFER: The major events would be by the plan of the day, and the specifics of who was eating with which group and which junior officer or which officer was taking this group around was a word-of-mouth thing. Yes, sir.

CAPT KYLE: Okay. No further questions from me.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Does anybody else have any further questions?

MR. WOODY: Could I clarify, if I understand, that you produced this form for us?

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

MR. WOODY: I'd like to thank you very much.

LCDR PFEIFER: You're welcome.

PANEL MEMBER: I do have one -- non-related to the questions of the search and rescue, but I do have -- we asked -- it may save us some time if you know the answer to this question, and I think this request came down from Commander Caccivio. There was a question about the optics versus gage check while doing the drive.

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. I don't know that it was or wasn't checked. I did ask the chief of the boat who frequently stands dive and also another Chief O'Keefe who is a longtime member of our ship's company, and he said the optics is at 64 feet and it always has been. And so that is what we train to, 64 feet on number-two scope.

PANEL MEMBER: What the question really was, XO, is 64 feet, but, frequently, when the boat submerges, there is a check of the optics and what the depth gage reads.

LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir, and I can't answer that. I don't -- I don't know, but we can find that answer out for you.

PANEL MEMBER: Okay. If you could ask the officer of the deck and the diving officer who were on there and that information is available, we don't need to bring them up here. You could just give us a call with that. That would be great.

LCDR PFEIFER: Aye-aye, sir. I'll do that.
MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Having no further
questions, that ends our interview with Lieutenant
Commander Pfeifer.

The time is about 14:32, and we would like to thank you very much for coming up and speaking with us. LCDR PFEIFER: You're welcome, sir.

[End of interview with Lieutenant Commander Gerald Pfeifer.]